According to this standard, the employer must find that his rights are not reckless or manifestly negligible, for example at 2482, 2489, but the burden is «relatively low». Id. at 2482. The court is therefore not tasked with interpreting the agreement, but simply with determining whether the case «involves a question of interpretation of the contract». «Sheet Metal Workers, 893 F.2d to 203 (cited as Line R.R., 850 F.2d to 376). Although it can be argued that practices concerning other types of railway wagons at other sites cannot constitute tacit agreements on the repair of freight wagons at the sites in question, the opposite is certainly also questionable. The nature of the earlier practice on which the contested practice is based is not necessarily identical to the contested practice in order to satisfy the carriers` burden of proving a contested contractual justification. See Consolidated Rail, 109 pp. Ct.
2485-89 (the railways` previous practice of requiring drug testing as part of employees` physical examinations only when a drug problem was known or suspected, fulfilled the railways` burden of demonstrating questionable contractual justification when it began requiring routine drug investigations by staff). Under Missouri law, the right to intervene in infringement does not depend on the existence of a contract and may indeed be based on «a reasonable expectation of business relationship.» Fischer, Spuhl, Herzwurm &Assocs., Inc. v. Forrest T. Jones &Co., 586 P.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo bench 1979). However, the finding of the Carmen`s claims would inevitably lead to an interpretation of the collective agreements. If it turns out that the current agreements allow carriers to enter into lease agreements with TTX, it is difficult to imagine how a contractual agreement could serve as a basis for a delicate right of intervention. Since the claims of Carmen`s State Law require an interpretation of the agreements, they are anticipated by the «exceptional» preventive force of the Railway Labor Act. Deford v. so Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080, 1085 (8th Cir.); Cert. denied, 492 U.P.
927, 109 p. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1989). Sensitive union interference claims must also fail, as the service of the communications referred to in section 6, separate from the evidence of previous agreements, cannot be considered a «reasonable expectation» of a potential contract. We thus reaffirm the Rejection by the District Court of Carmen`s delicate claims of interference. . .